THE SLOW-DOWN, AN UNPROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY-A PYRRHIC VICTORY FOR MANAGEMENT by unknown
NOTES
THE SLOW-DOWN, AN UNPROTECTED CONCERTED
ACTIVITY-A PYRRHIC VICTORY FOR MANAGEMENT:"
FEDERAL labor legislation aims to reduce industrial strife, promote pro-
ductive efficiency, and equalize bargaining power between employers and
employees.' To attain these interrelated objectives, the Taft-Hartley Act,
like the Wagner Act, gives employees the right to engage in various forms of
concerted activity free from management interference. 2 Thus employees are
free to join unions, to strike, to picket, and to bargain collectively.3
Not all concerted activities are protected, however.4 The Taft-Hartley
Act expressly prohibits certain secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes,
and strikes for recognition in defiance of a certified union.5 Even before the
passage of that Act, courts had held that strikes in breach of a collective
bargaining agreement 6 and strikes to force an employer to violate a federal
* Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. No.60 (Sept. 23, 1950).
1. Those purposes are expressed in the preamble of the National Labor Relations Act,
49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), as amended, Labor-Management Relations
Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151 (Supp. 1950). For a survey of federal policy
toward labor-management relations during the past 50 years, see Feinsinger & Witte, Labor,
Legislation, and the Role of Government, 71 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 48 (July 1950). See, gen-
erally, METz, LABOR POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT C. 1, 3, 9-11 (1945); BoWmIAN,
PUBLIC CONTROL OF LABOR RELATIONS C. 1-2 (1942).
2. Section 7 of the Wagner Act established the right of employees to engage in con-
certed activities "for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1946), unchanged as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1950). Section 8 (a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 7." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(1) (1946), unchanged as amended,
61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1) (Supp. 1950). Specifically, it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discharge employees in order to discourage membership in a
labor organization. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (1946), limited in part by the
Taft-Hartley amendment, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. 1950). The
right to strike is expressly guaranteed. 49 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1946), as
amended with certain limitations, 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (Supp. 1950).
3. For a discussion of these concerted activities, see MooRE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 425-51 (1946); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor 1anagement Rela-
lions Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1947). See also Cox & Seidman, Federalism and
Labor Relations, 64 HAuv. L. REv. 211,231-41 (1950).
4. For a discussion of unlawful concerted activities, see Note, Availability of NLRA
Remedies to "Unlawful" Strikers, 59 HARv. L. REv. 747 (1946).
5. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4)(A),(C),(D) (Supp. 1950). For a discussion
of cases under this section, see Walsh, Union Unfair Labor Practices, 1 CCH LAB. LAW J.
1095, 1100-2 (Nov. 1950).
6. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939) (activities by employees in
repudiation of a collective agreement contrkvene the purpose of the Act; thus the em-
ployees are not protected from discharge); Joseph Dyson & Sons Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445,
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law7 were outside the protective ambit of the Wagner Act. Strikes have also
been denied protection if they contravene a federal statute, such as that
forbidding mutiny,8 or if they violate state laws prohibiting the seizure of
property or acts of violence.9
But until recently, the National Labor Relations Board has never put
partial strikes-refusals, short of a complete stoppage, to carry out reason-
able orders of the employer-into this category of unprotected concerted
activities. 0 If an employer discharged employees for engaging in a partial
strike, he committed an unfair labor practice." He could insist that the
partial strikers do his bidding or leave the plant, and if they refused, he could
replace them in order to carry on his business. But if the employees applied
for reinstatement on the employer's terms before their positions had been
filled, he was compelled to take them back.'2
447 (1947) (strike during life of contract containing no-strike clause); Scullin Steel Co.,
65 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1946) (strike for wage increase during life of contract), enforced as mod-
ified on other grounds, 161 F.2d 143 (Sth Cir. 1947).
7. American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302, 1312 (1944) (strike to compel an employer
to violate Wage Stabilization Act of 1942).
8. Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 40 (1942) (seamen on strike away
from home port).
9. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253, 254, 258 (1939) ("sit-
down" strike found to be a seizure of property in violation of local statutes and common law);
Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740
(1942) (mass picketing, threats, and violence in violation of Wisconsin Employment Peace
Act of 1939).
10. Massey Gin and Machine Works Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 189, 202 (1948) (refusal to work
on a new schedule), enforcement denied per curiam, 173 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1949); Montgomery
Ward & Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 432, 444-6 (1945) (refusal to process orders from a struck plant),
enforcement denied, 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946); Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 46
N.L.R.B. 714, 716 (1943) (leaving jobs before close of working day), enforced as modified.
on these grounds, 147 F.2d 262, 267 (6th Cir. 1945); Cudahy Packing Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 837,
863 (1941) (intermittent stoppages); Armour & Co., 25 N.L.R.B. 989, 996 (1940) (instruction
by union to "slaughter gang" to schedule only 185 cattle in spite of company order for 190);
Condenser Corp. of America, 22 N.L.R.B. 347, 431 (1940) (temporary halt in work pending
settlement of a grievance), enforced as modified on these grounds, 128 F.2d 67, 77 (3d Cir.
1942); Good Coal Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 136, 146 (1939) (refusal to work on Labor Day in spite
of notice to work in accordance with company rule that absence without permission is cause
for discharge), enforcement granted, 110 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 63a
(1940); C.G. Conn, Ltd., 10 N.L.R.B. 498, 514 (1938) (refusal to work overtime), enforce-
ment denied, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939); Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 685 (1938)
(refusal to work overtime). Cf. U.A.W.A., A.F. of L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (prohibition by a state labor board of intermittent
stoppages held not in conflict with Taft-Hartley Act).
11. In that event the employer was ordered to reinstate the employees in their former
positions, with back pay. See Montgomery Ward & 'Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 432 (1945) and C.G.
Conn, Ltd., 10 N.L.R.B. 498 (1938).
12. NLRB v. MacKay Radio and Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Gardner-Denver
Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 81, 82 (1944); Pinaud, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 235 (1943); and see Montgomery
Ward & Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 432, 444-6 (1945) (intermediate report); C.G. Conn, Ltd. v-
NLRB, 108 F.2d 390,401 (7th Cir. 1939) (dissenting opinion).
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Courts of Appeals, however, in a series of reversals of Board orders, have
held that partial strikes are not protected by the Act. 3 The courts declare
that employees have no right to defy any reasonable order of an employer
unless they stop work completely. 14 Apparently these decisions are based
on the desirability of limiting the extent to which the Act restricts manage-
ment's traditional authority to discipline disobedient workers. Accordingly,
employees have been denied protection from discharge if they defy orders to
work customary overtime, 15 to process orders from a struck plant,1" to end
a temporary work stoppage,' 7 or to work on a new hourly schedule."3
The Board has now reversed its attitude toward partial strikes by follow-
ing these decisions. In Elk Lumber Co.19 it unanimously found one type of
partial strike, the slow down, to be "so indefensible as to warrant the
employer in discharging the participating employees."'" An employer, in-
troducing a new method of carloading, changed the system of pay from a
piece rate wage averaging $2.70 an hour in earnings to a flat hourly wage of
$1.50. Immediately following these changes, output per carloading crew
dropped to an average of 1 carload a day from the prior average of 1 2 carloads.
The employees asserted that the new rate of output was equal to the quota
in other plants in the area, and was a good day's work at the new wage. The
employer expressed his dissatisfaction with the slow down and invited sug-
gestions for increasing productivity. The employees maintained that
greater productivity would result only from an increase in the hourly wage
13. Massey Gin and Machine Works Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948), enforcement denied
per curiam, 173 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1949); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d
486 (8th Cir. 1946); NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America, 128 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1942);
C.G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939).
14. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946). The
court stressed that it is implied in the contract of hiring that employees shall comply with
all reasonable orders of the employer so long as they are not arbitrary or capricious. See
also C.G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108, F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 1939).
15. C.G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390,400 (7th Cir. 1939).
16. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486,496 (8th Cir. 1946). This would
be an unprotected activity under the Taft-Hartley Act in any event, because it would
constitute a secondary boycott. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 8(b) (4) (A) (Supp. 1950).
17. NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America, 128 F.2d 67,77 (3d Cir. 1942).
18. Massey Gin and Machine Works Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948), enforcement denied
per curiam, 173 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1949).
19. 91 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (Sept. 23, 1950).
20. Id. at 9. The Board relied on the test of indefensibility which it announced in
Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686 (1938): "We do not interpret this [Section 7 of
the Wagner Act] to mean that it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee for
any activity sanctioned by a union or otherwise in the nature of a collective activity. The
question before us is, we think, whether this particular activity was so indefensible, under
the circumstances, as to warrant the respondent, under the Act, in discharging the Stewards
for this type of Union activity. We do not think it was." The trial examiner in the Elk
case had held that the men were not discharged for engaging in a concerted activity, but
that they were discharged for a concerted refusal to obey their employer. Elk Lumber Co.,
supra at 6, n. 5 [Report of Proceedings p. 102].
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or a return to a piece rate wage. The employer promised to report back to
the carloaders after investigating practices in another mill. This report was
never made. The employer never advised the employees of an output he
considered satisfactory. Without warning, he discharged the protesting
employees. The employees were not members of a union recognized by the
employer, nor was there a collective bargaining agreement. 21
The Board upheld the action of the employer on the ground that this case
was analogous to the Conn and Montgomery Ward cases, 22 in which the
seventh and eighth circuits held that the Wagner Act did not protect partial
strikes. The Board defined "slow down" as a conscious adoption by employees
of a rate of production unsatisfactory to the employer and lower than the
employees could have adopted, or would have adopted for more money.2 5
It found that such an activity constitutes a refusal to accept reasonable
terms of employment without engaging in a complete stoppage and
therefore justifies discharge. 24 The implication is that all slow downs are
unprotected.
The Board should not have regarded the Conn and Montgomery Ward
decisions as controlling. For one thing, the Taft-Hartley Act, unlike the
Wagner Act, specifically defines a "strike" so as to include slow downs.2
For another, the Elk case, unlike the Conn and Montgomery Ward cases,
did not involve the defiance of a specific order.26 The employees, in the
21. Id. at 4-6. The Elk Lumber Company was charged with engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
See note 3 supra. The protection of the Act extends to non-union employees engaged in
concerted activities. NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948); Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 277 (1949).
22. See note 10 supra.
23. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. No. 60, p. 10 (Sept. 23, 1950).
24. Id. at 8.
25. The term "strike" is defined by the Taft-Hartley Act to include "any concerted
slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees." 61 STAT. 161 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 142(2) (Supp. 1950). Nothing in the Act, except as specifically provided, is to.
"interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. . . ." 61 STAT. 151
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (Supp. 1950). For a comment on the application of this definition of
strike, see U.A.W.A., A. F. of L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U.S. 245, 268 n.3 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas). The Board in the Elk
case made no mention of the Act's definition of strike.
It is arguable that any form of partial strike is a "concerted interruption of operations
by employees," and therefore a protected activity under the Taft-Hartley Act. It is sig-
nificant to note that the court in the Conn case, 108 F.2d 390 (7th cir. 1939), selected a.
definition of strike which excluded the partial strike: "The term 'strike' is applied commonly
to a combined effort on the part of a body of workmen employed by the same master to en-
force a demand for higher wages, shorter hours, or some other concession by stopping work in
a body at a prearranged time, and refusing to resume work until the demanded concession
shall have been granted." Id. at 397.
26. The principal argument of the General Counsel in the Elk case was that "at the
time of the discharge there still had been no failure to comply with any command of man-
agement. If such activity [a slow down] is to be condemned by the Board, it should only be
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absence of a guide to production, had no alternative but to determine their
own rate of output and to that extent work on their own terms.2
If the Board insists on regarding all slow downs as unprotected, then its
definition of "slow down" is too broad.28 The crucial consideration should
be what constitutes normal output under the circumstances, not what out-
put the employees could have adopted.29 If it can be shown that an alleged
slow down has resulted in less than normal production, then it might con-
stitute a refusal to accept reasonable terms of employment. The deter-
mination of a norm is difficult." It would mean deciding how much slowness
constitutes a slow down. The Board might arrive at a norm by considering
evidence of output in other plants in the area, working under similar con-
ditions. In the absence of a change in working conditions, the norm might be
determined by past performance. Whatever the method of determination,
dissatisfaction on the part of the employer is no criterion of normal produc-
tion.
In the Elk case the limitation of production may have reduced output
below normal; but in fact the Board had no evidence upon which to de-
termine a norm. It compared rates of output under essentially different
circumstances. The employer's unilateral introduction of new methods of
done after there has been a deliberate refusal to do the Employer's bidding. Without a de-
mand there cannot be a refusal." Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel, p. 4, Elk Lum-
ber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (Sept. 23, 1950).
27. Even if one accepts the view that the dissatisfaction of the employer was the equiva-
lent of an order to increase production, it was still left to the employees to determine their
own work pace. Workers, whether aware of it or not, form themselves into groups with
customs, duties, and even rituals. The working group determines the output of individual
members. Even with an assembly line method of production in which management may
control the speed of the line, the amount of output may be determined by the informal organ-
ization. MOORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 313-35; MAYo, THE SociAl. PROBLEMS OF AN
INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION 79-82 (1945).
28. See text at note 23 supra.
29. In an earlier decision involving not a concerted slow down, but a slow down by a
single employee, the Board arrived at its decision after considering evidence to determine
normal output. The evidence indicated that the production record of the disciplined em-
ployee was the lowest among workers doing a similar job in the plant and below time-study
estimates of the time required for the operation. The Board concluded that "a slowdown in
a plant working on a high priority war contract is not a type of conduct which should be
protected against reasonable disciplinary action .. " Underwood Machinery Co., 74
N.L.R.B. 641, 6.45, 646 (1947).
A recent state case in which normal output was not accepted as a criterion is Stolper
Steel Products Corp., 24 BNA Lab. Rel. Ref. Man. 1185 (1949). During wage negotia-
tions on a new contract the union decided to produce at slightly above normal output
(100%). There followed a reduction in output from 127% to between 100 and 105%. The
Board ordered the union to cease and desist in the slow down. The dissent stressed the
point that men should not be penalized for not producing at their maximum so long as they
are not producing below normal.
30. There are numerous sources of error in trying to determine normal output. See
Carroll, Jr., What is the Measure of a Fair Day's Work? 7 ADVANCED MANAGEMENT 152
(Oct.-Dec. 1942). For management's recognition of the difficulties, see c. VI, How Fast is
1951]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
operation and his unilateral termination of an incentive system were sig-
nificant factors affecting worker response. Limitations in output" are
inevitable among workers denied a voice in making decisions affecting their
every-day work.3 2 Furthermore, an incentive wage,33 if the incentive has
been effective, results in output substantially above what is achieved under
a flat hourly system. 34 The Board made the mistake of treating an ad-
Fast? in CHEYFITZ, CONSTRUCTIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 55-68 (1947). For the trade
union view and a discussion of the wide variation in the concept of normal as an objective
measurement, see GOMBERG, A TRADE UNION ANALYSIS OF TIME STUDY 73, 147, 131-46,
165 (1948).
Of course the collective agreement may itself specify what the norm is to be. Time
study results at best provide a guidepost to the bargainers and keep bargaining within
rational bounds. CHEYFITZ, supra at 57-9, 62-8, 87; GOMBERG, supra at 171-88; SLICH-
TER, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 344,436 (1941).
31. Methods of limiting output range from slowing down to planned waste of time by
meticulous elaboration of work. In addition, output is often limited by employees hiding
their discoveries of new and better ways of doing a job. These conclusions result from a
study based on interviews with 350 workers and 65 executives in 105 establishments in 47
localities. Some 223 incidents were found in which restriction was evident. See MATHEWSON,
RESTRICTION OF OUTPUT AMONG UNORGANIZED WORKERS 7, 15-126 (1931).
32. This conclusion is supported by studies of group behavior among industrial work-
ers. In a controlled experiment at Western Electric's Hawthorne Plant, the Bank Wiremen
group, who were denied a voice in making decisions concerning their work, limited output.
The Test Room Girls, on the other hand, who were consulted with respect to the proposed
changes at every point of the experiment, continually raised output. Even when conditions
of work were made more difficult, these girls apparently had no thought of engaging in re-
strictive practices. MAYO, THE SocIAL PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION 70-3,
S2 (1945). A similar conclusion was reached in a survey of uncontrolled work situations.
MATHEWSON, op. cit. supra note 31, at 146-59. The experience of many union leaders sub-
stantiates the findings of the Hawthorne experiments. See Golden & Ruttenberg, Union
-Participation: Key to Greater Productivity, 7 ADVANCED MANAGEMENT 54-60 (April-June
1942). Many business leaders and industrial consultants attribute limitations in output,
at least in part, to failure to keep employees informed of important plans and to invite sug-
gestions on matters which are of vital concern on the job. See, e.g., Henry Ford II, The
Challenge of Human Engineering, 11 ADVANCED MANAGEMENT 48-51 (June 1946); Mc-
Murry, Management Mentalities and Worker Relations, 7 ADVANCED MANAGEMENT 165
(Oct.-Dec. 1942).
33. Incentive schemes involve wage rates which vary according to the output of in-
dividuals, groups, or departments. Profit sharing and co-partnership plans also may be
classified as incentive schemes. CHEYFITZ, CONSTRUCTIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1947).
34. Productivity under incentive schemes is generally higher than productivity under
hourly wage systems. Reports by management to the War Labor Board on the operation
of new wage incentive plans indicated that an increase in production of 40 per cent per man-
hour occurred during the first ninety days of incentive production. These reports covered
one million workers. An American Management Association survey corroborated the
W.L.B. reports. Wherever an incentive wage replaced hourly payments output per man-
hour increased 20 to 50 per cent. CHEYFITZ, CONSTRUCTIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 70
(1947). See also MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 396 (1945).
Financial incentives, however, do not automatically cause increases in output. Co-
operation among members of the group and confidence in management must exist before the
offer of increased income operates as an incentive. In the Hawthorne experiment, workers
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mission that more could have been produced as an admission that less than
a reasonable amount was actually being produced.
All these considerations should be irrelevant, however, because a slow
down should be treated just like a complete stoppage. If an employer wishes
to guard against a slow down, he can do so in the same manner as against a
total stoppage-by seeking to insert in the collective agreement a provision
prohibiting it.35 And in any event he can lock out the partial strikers and
seek to replace them unless they agree to work on his terms."
Moreover, the implication of the Board's decision that all slow downs are
unprotected undermines the basic objectives of the Act. It invites industrial
strife by forcing employees to resort to a strike in the form of a complete
stoppage when a less drastic economic weapon might be used.3 7 It also
aggravates existing inequalities of bargaining power. Many unorganized
workers and workers in financially weak or poorly organized unions are so
insecure that they may be unable to risk a strike in the form of a complete
stoppage." By depriving these workers of what may be their only effective
in the Bank Wiring room were paid on a group incentive. "Work done was in accord with
the group's conception of a day's work; this was exceeded by only one individual who was
cordially disliked." MAYO, THE SociAl PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION 42,
111 (1945). Another factor limiting the effectivness of incentive schemes is the tendency of
workers to believe that under a piece-rate system, output above a certain level results in a
reduction of the piece rate. For example, a group of foundrymen held their pay to $5 per
day for a year though they could easily have earned $10 a day. After the superintendent
convinced them that the rate would not be cut, they stepped up production. McMurry,
Management Mentalities and Worker Reaction, 7 ADVANCED MANAGEMENT 164, 170 (Oct.-
Dec. 1942). See also MATHEWSON, op. cit. supra note 31, at 15-84; WARNER & Low, THE
SOCIAL SYSTEM[ OF THE MODERN FACTORY 104 (1947); and Drake, When Wage Incentves
Fail, 7 ADVANCED MANAGEMENT 42 (Jan.-Mar. 1942). This is by no means a peculiarly
American phenomenon. The coal shortage behind the iron curtain was aggravated recently
by a slow down among Czech miners, weary of speed-ups through incentives. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 20, 1950, p. 1, col. 6.
35. See, e.g., AGREEMENT BETWEEN UAW-CIO AND THE FORD MOTOR Co., art. 5 § 3
(Sept. 28, 1949): "The Union will not cause or permit its members to cause, nor will any
member of the Union take part in, any sit-down, stay-in, or slow-down in any plant of the
Company or any curtailment of work or restriction of production or interference with the
operations of the company." If a union breaches an agreement of this sort, then its activity
is not protected under the rationale of the Sands case. See note 6 supra.
36. See note 12 supra.
37. The Board has recognized this argument in a recent case. See Morand Brothers
Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 4 (Sept. 25, 1950) (strike against only one member
company of a trade association during negotiations with the association, rather than against
all member companies, held to be protected under the Act). See also Harnischfeger Corp.,
9 N.L.R.B. 676 (1938), in which the Board found that the day shift's refusal to work over-
time and the early arrival of the night shift were protected activities. Though these actions
caused the employer considerable difficulty, "calling a strike would have occasioned much
more serious difficulty, and it cannot be contended that employees may properly be dis-
charged for calling a strike." Id. at 686.
38. Only 14 to 16 million workers in the United States are members of labor unions.
Approximately 75% of the total labor force is unorganized. Size of Labor Unions in the
United States, 71 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 113 (July 1950). In addition to unorganized
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method of concerted action, the decision hinders the growth of labor or-
ganization and withdraws protection from those least able to protect them-
selves from arbitrary actions of the employer.39
Perhaps most important of all, the Elk decision impedes the development
of labor-management cooperation essential to productive efficiency. It
encourages an employer to make unilateral changes in working conditions
because he knows that he can discharge those employees who engage in a
slow down as a result of such changes. In turn, unilateral action by an
employer tends to create a work climate in which employees limit output,
either deliberately or instinctively. 4° Participation by employees in the
determination of wages, methods of production, and production quotas
promotes a spirit of confidence essential to the gradual elimination of re-
strictive practices. 41 In the final analysis, managerial authority depends
workers, workers in poorly organized as well as financially weak unions have limited ability
to resort to a complete work stoppage. Unless the union is well organized and equipped with
sufficient reserve funds, a shut down may not constitute an effective weapon. See MooRE,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE SocIAL ORDER 428 (1946).
39. For a discussion of management practices in unorganized plants and the influence
of the threat of unionization on these practices, see SISTER, EcoNoMIcs OF THE LABOR
MARiKET 257-76 (1949).
40. Such behavior gives rise to labor fears of the speed-up and wage cuts, a major ob-
stacle to the successful introduction of incentive schemes by management. See SLICHTER,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 312; CHEYFITz, op. cit. supra note 30, at 73-5; and Drake, When
Wage Incentives Fail, 7 ADVANCED MANAGEMENT 42, 43 (Jan.-Mar. 1942).
The instinctive nature of the slow down was revealed in a case study where members
of a work team did not understand clearly the method of payment, which, though favorable
to the employees, had been unilaterally introduced. "On first observation there was a
tendency to ascribe this to an alleged habit of 'restricting output'; it was speedily found that
this phrase expresses a gross simplification which is essentially untrue. Apparently it is not
enough to have an enlightened company policy, a carefully devised (and blue-printed)
plan of manufacture. To stop at this point, and merely administer such plan, however
logical, to workers with a take-it-on-leave-it attitude has much the same effect as adminis-
tering medicine to a recalcitrant patient. It may be good for him but he is not persuaded.
•... Wlith all the will in the world to cooperate he finds it difficult to persist in an action
for an end he cannot dimly see." MAYO, THE HUMAN PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVI-
LIZATION 119-121 (2d ed. 1946). See also, GOMBERG, A TRADE UNION ANALYSIS OF TIME
STUDY 95-106 (1948).
41. The sharing by labor and management of decisions of practical concern to both
remains one of the central problems of industrial relations. See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation
of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389, 401-
405 (1950).
Although they do not all agree on details, industrialists, labor leaders and students of labor
relations are convinced that some participation by workers in decisions affecting their every-
day work lives is essential to the efficient operation of organizations. "iThe only successful
organized human effort depends upon willing-even more, the enthusiastic-collaboration
of all members of an organization .... To be enthusiastic in their collaboration, men must
understand and agree upon the objectives toward which their efforts are directed .... They
must share not only in the material rewards of accomplishment, but in the psychological
rewards which come from being a hard hitting, self-governed and self disciplined team.
Above all they must have confidence in their leaders, and they must know that their leaders
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